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Executive Summary
In recent years, many health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have exited
the market for Medicare managed care; since 1998, the number of participating
plans has fallen from 346 to 174. As a result of this reduced participation by
HMOs, hundreds of thousands of Medicare beneficiaries have beeninvolun-
tarily disenrolled from the program at the end of each year from 1998 to 2001.
This paper estimates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services(CMS)1
capitation payments that are necessary to support the participation of various
numbers of HMOs in Medicare managed care per county market. This paper
does not make a normative statement about how many HMOs should be sup-
ported in this program; rather, it makes a positive statement about the levels of
payment necessary to support various numbers of HMOs.
The identification strategy is to observe how the number of participating
HMOs varies over counties and time in response to CMS payment, while con-
troffing for estimated costs. This paper studies the period 1993-2001 and fo-
cuses in particular on the variation in payment,independent of costs, that oc-
curred as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which dramatically
changed the way that HMOs are paid in this program. In light of the factthat it
may not be cost-effective for CMS to support HMOparticipation in relatively
rural or unpopulated counties, the sample used in this paper is limited to
the 60 percent of U.S. counties with the largest populationsof Medicare
beneficiaries.
The ordered probit results presented in this paper indicate that, to support
one Medicare HMO in 2001 in half of the counties inthe sample, CMS would
haveto pay $682.08 per average enrollee per month in the marginal county. To
support one Medicare HMO in 2001 in every county in the sample,CMS would
need to pay $1,008.25 per enrollee per month in the maximum-payment
county. For comparison, the maximum monthly payment paid byCMS to any
county in 2001 was $833.55.
This paper finds that 79.3 percent of counties in the sample received a CMS
payment in 2001 that was less than what was necessary to support asingle
HlIvIO in Medicare managed care. Compared to those counties that received a
payment exceeding the estimated threshold for HMO participation,these2 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
counties are, on average, more rural and less populated, with citizens who are
less wealthy and less educated. The relative disadvantage of rural and
unpopulated counties persists three years after the Balanced Budget Act of
1997, designed in part to eliminate such disparities, took effect.
I.Introduction
This paper studies how the equilibrium number of health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) participating in county Medicare managedcare
markets varies with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) capitation payment. The number of HMOs participating in
Medicare managed care markets is of interest for severalreasons. The
participation of a single HMO in a Medicare managed care market of-
fers Medicare beneficiaries in that market an alternative to fee-for-
service care. The participation of multiple HMOs in a market creates
competition for enrollment, which results in greater benefits and/or
lower costs for managed care enrollees.2
This paper does not take a position on how many HMOs should be
supported in this program in different areas of the United States; that
question is left for policy makers. Instead, this paper seeks to provide
the best estimate of the levels of payment necessary to support various
numbers of FIMOs.
The identification strategy of this paper is to examine how thenum-
ber of participating HMOs in this program variesover counties and
time in response to CMS payment, controlling for estimated costs. In
particular, variation in payment independent of costs occurs because of
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which dramatically changed theway
that HMOs are paid in this program.
Those eligible for Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) and enrolled
in Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) may enroll ina
Medicare managed care plan, if one is available.3 Figure 1.1 depicts the
number of Medicare managed care enrollees from 1985 to 2001,a pe-
riod during which enrollment grew from 0.44 miffion in 1985 to 6.35
miffion in 1999, before falling to 5.6 million in 2001. In 2001, 15 percent
of all Medicare beneficiaries chose managed care.5
The continuous growth in enrollment between 1985 and 1999 masks
considerable change in the number of HMO plans participating in
Medicare managed care. Figure 1.2 shows that the number of partici-
pating plans rose considerably during the early and mid-i 990s, but fell
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Figure 1.1
Medicare managed care enrollment
coincides with the period when the provisions of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 were in effect.
As a result of the reduced participation of FIMOs, many Medicare
beneficiaries have been involuntarily disenrolled from the program. At
the end of 1998, 407,000 (or 7 percent of all) Medicare HMO enrollees
were involuntarily disenrolled, and 327,000 (5.3 percent) were involun-
tarily disenrolled at the end of 1999.6 It is estimated that 934,000 en-
rollees (15.1 percent) were disenrolled at the end of the year 2000.
Beneficiaries involuntarily disenrolled from a Medicare managed
care plan are forced either to find another HMO in their county with a
risk contract from Medicare or to return to traditional fee-for-service
Medicare. Laschober et al. (1999) surveyed Medicare beneficiaries
whose HMO had recently withdrawn from Medicare. They found
that one-third experienced a decline in benefits, 39 percent reported
higher monthly premiums, and one in seven lost prescription drug
coverage.
It may not be cost-effective for CMS to support HMO participa-
tion in Medicare managed care in relatively rural or unpopulated coun-
ties; for this reason, the sample used in this paper is limited to the
60 percent of U.S. counties with the largest population of Medicare
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Figure 1.2
Number of Medicare managed care plans
sample received a CMS payment less than what was necessary to sup-
port a single HMO in the Medicare managed care market. In particular,
CMS appears to underestimate the payment necessary to support
HMOs in rural and less populous areas.
Section II of this paper outlines the methodology for examining the
relationship between CMS payment rates and the extent of HMO par-
ticipation. Section III describes the data used in this study; Section IV
presents the results of the empirical work, and the final section pre-
sents our conclusions.
II.Methodology
To illustrate why higher payments may lead to a larger number of par-
ticipating l-lMOs, suppose that the Medicare managed care market is in
equffibrium, and then CMS raises the payment to HMOs while costs re-
main constant. The payment has been raised above the marginal cost of
caring for additional Medicare beneficiaries, so HMOs wifi compete to
increase enrollment and therefore profits. HMOs compete for enroll-
ment by increasing benefits (and, therefore, marginal and average
costs). The provision of additional benefits raises the cost curves; in
particular, the average cost curve will rise to equal the new, higher pay-
ment. The provision of additional benefits makes Medicare managedCMS Payments 5
care more attractive relative to fee-for-service Medicare; this shifts the
demand curve for Medicare managed care and, as a result, the new
equilibrium will be associated with a higher quantity of enrollment.
Since marginal costs are rising in enrollment, the higher enrollment
may be associated with a larger number of participating HMOs and
cannot be associated with fewer participating FIMOs.
Congress, in the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, changed CMS's
formula for setting payment levels effective in 1998. Prior to 1998,
county CMS payments were set according to the 1982 Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFEA). Under TEFRA, HMOs were paid 95
percent of the projected average fee-for-service costs of Medicare
beneficiaries in that county, multiplied by a risk-adjustment factor
based on the enrollee's age, sex, Medicaid eligibility, institutional sta-
tus, and working status.
The TEFRA payment formula was criticized for overpaying HMOs.
Despite the strategy of paying HMOs 95 percent of projected average
fee-for-service costs, several studies concur that it cost CMS more to en-
roll beneficiaries in managed care than if they had remained in
fee-for-service Medicare. The reason is that enrollees in Medicare man-
aged care have proven to be systematically healthier than fee-for-
service Medicare beneficiaries. As a result, the medical expenses of the
Medicare managed care enrollees were far lower than 95 percent of av-
erage fee-for-service costs.8
The TEFRA payment formula was also criticized for creating dispari-
ties in payments across counties; in particular, few HMOs entered rural
counties. It was argued that tying managed care payments to local
fee-for-service charges rewarded counties that were inefficient at pro-
viding fee-for-service care and counties with high reimbursements for
graduate medical education, which are included in the fee-for-service
costs.
Concerned about the rising cost of caring for Medicare beneficiaries,
Congress passed the BBA of 1997, which created the Medicare +
Choice program (M+C) and changed the way that HMOs are reim-
bursed for risk contracts.9 Under M+C, CMS, beginning in 1998, pays
HMOs the greatest of the following three rates'°:
1. A blend of an input-price adjusted national rate and an area-specific
rate; however, if total projected payments exceed a budget limit, this
blended rate is reduced. The blend is intended to reduce the variation
in payments across counties by increasing the lowest rates and decreas-
ing the highest rates.6 Cawley, Chemew, and McLaughlin
A minimum or "floor" payment, adjusted annually, intended to in-
crease rates in historically lower-rate counties where Medicare man-
aged care plans generally have not been offered.
A minimum increase over the previous year's payment, which is in-
tended to protect high payment areas. For 1998, 1999, and January and
February of 1999, the minimum increase over the previous year's pay-
ment was 2 percent. Since March 2001, the minimum increase is 3 per-
cent.
Since the BBA took effect, the budget limits have typically been bind-
ing, forcing reductions in the blended rate. These reductions have
been so great that only in the year 2000 did any county receive
the blended payment. The BBA also affected HMO profits by increas-
ing their administrative burdens and charging them user fees (which
amounted to $95 million in both 1998 and 1999), the proceeds of which
are used to inform Medicare beneficiaries about their managed care
options.
There is one final component of CMS payments to HMOs. The Bal-
anced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 mandates that CMS, starting in
the year 2000, pay bonuses of 5 percent the first year and 3 percent the
second year to HMOs that offer Medicare+Choice in previously un-
served counties.11
Three studies have modeled the decisions of individual HMOs to
participate in the Medicare managed care market (Adamache and
Rossiter 1986, Porell and Wallack 1990, and Abraham et al. 2000). Each
of these studies used HMO-level data, which entails two complicated
problems, neither of which is addressed by the three referenced
studies.
The first problem is that, in counties with noncompetitive Medicare
managed care markets, the entry decision of each firm is a function of
the entry decisions of all potential participants in that market. Compli-
cating the problem is that some potential participants are not observed
because they chose not to enter.
The second problem inherent in the use of HMO-level data to study
this problem is the likelihood of multiple equilibria. For example, a
county may be able to support two HMOs in its Medicare managed
care market, but it may be random which two HMOs participate.
Bresnahan and Reiss (199 Ia) show that multiple equilibria occur in si-
multaneous-move models under very general conditions.
In this paper, we study the aggregate number of HMOs participatingCMS Payments 7
at the county level. This avoids the problems of simultaneity and mul-
tiple equilibria because we are concerned only with the number of
firms that can be supported in the county not the identities of the indi-
vidual HMOs.
In our focus on the number of firms that can be supported in distinct
geographic markets, our paper is similar to an earlier literature that in-
cludes Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991b); Dranove, Shanley, and
Simon (1992); Kronick, Goodman, Wennberg, and Wagner (1993); and
Brasure, Stearns, Norton, and Ricketts(1999).12However, we differ
from this literature because our regressor of interest is not the market
size but the market "price."
We follow the methodology developed in Bresnahan and Reiss (1987,
1990, 1991b) in using a latent profit variable to motivate the use of an
ordered probit to study the number of firms that can be supported in a
geographic market. We assume that profit has an additively separable
unobserved component, represented by an error term. It is assumed
that the error term is normally distributed, independent across markets
and independent of the regressors. We assume that all HMOs in the
same market have the same unobserved profit. These assumptions per-
mit the use of the ordered probit to estimate entry thresholds. The de-
pendent variable is the number of HMOs participating in Medicare
managed care in a county.
We estimate the latent profit function using a reduced form ap-
proach. Cameron and Trivedi (1998) conclude that when the data gen-
erating process is a continuous latent variable (in our case unobserved
profits), an ordered model should be used in place of a count data re-
gression model.13 Accordingly, we estimate our model using an or-
dered probit regression. The number of participating HMOs in a given
county in a given year is regressed on payment and the factors that af-
fect variable costs, market size, the probability of enrollment, and fixed
costs.
Ordered probit regression will provide us with threshold values of
CMS payments for HMO participation. If13prepresents the ordered
probit coefficient on CMS payment,13represents the vector of all other
ordered probit coefficients, and X represents the set of regressors other
than the CMS payment, then PN, the minimum CMS payment needed
to support the participation of N 1-ilvIOs, is:
XN Xf38 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
where XN is the cutoff in the ordered probit regression associated with
N HMOs.'4 We predict that a higher CMS payment, controlling for ob-
servable factors that affect costs, will be associated with the participa-
tion of a greater number of I-IMOs.
III.Data
This section explains how we control for each component of the profit
function introduced in the previous section. The data used in this pa-
per come from two sources. CMS is the source for data on Medicare
managed care enrollment, Medicare managed care contracts with
HMOs, CMS payments by county, and input price indices. The second
major source of data for this paper is the Area Resource File (ARF),
which provides medical and demographic data at the county level.15
The unit of observation in this paper is the county. A market has tra-
ditionally been defined as a region in which a single price prevails for a
homogenous good.16 By this definition, counties represent distinct mar-
kets for Medicare managed care; CMS sets Medicare managed care
payments on a county-by-county basis. Furthermore, CMS requires
separate contracts from HMOs for each county in which they wish to
offer Medicare managed care.
For the purposes of this study, a risk plan is defined as participating
in a county Medicare managed care market if CMS market penetration
files indicate that the plan has enrolled at least 0.5 percent of the
county's Medicare-eligible residents.'7 We exclude plans that have en-
rolled less than 0.5 percent of eligible residents because plans with such
low county enrollment may not actually be operating in the county.
CMS market penetration files list enrollees by their county of residence
instead of the county in which they have enrolled in an HMO; as a re-
sult, many plan enrollees are found in counties where the plan does not
have a contract to operate.
The number of HMOs participating in a county, by year, is shown in
table 1.1. Table 1.1 indicates that the number of counties with zero
HMOs participating in Medicare managed care fell every year from
1993 to 1999, but rose from 1999 to 2001.
It may not be cost-effective for CMS to support HMO participation in
Medicare managed care in relatively rural or unpopulated counties. Ta-
ble 1.2 lists the percentage of counties with at least one HMO partici-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































410 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
lation of Medicare beneficiaries. The table shows that counties in the
fifth (most populous) quintile are several times more likely to have
a participating HMO than are counties in the first quintile (least
populous).
Many counties are too rural or unpopulated ever to support HMO
participation, so we exclude these counties from the sample. Thus,
their history of nonparticipation does not influence the payment
thresholds estimated for other counties. The sample used in this paper
consists of counties whose population of Medicare beneficiaries is in
the top three quintiles; in other words, its 1990 Medicare population
was at least 2,783. In addition, all counties in Alaska and Hawaii are
excluded.
The sample contains observations of these counties for each year
from 1993 to 2001. Plan-county data are aggregated to the HMO level
and HMO-level data are aggregated to the county level.18 The depend-
ent variable used in this paper is the number of HMOs participating in
a county in a given year. In ordered probit regressions, this dependent
variable is top-coded at six or more.'9
The HMO Profit Function
The profit function for all HMOs in a market is:
H=[PAVC]dSrF+
where P is the CMS payment, AVC is the average variable cost func-
tion, d is the probability of enrollment in Medicare managed care of the
representative Medicare eligible, S is the number of Medicare eligibles,
r is the interest rate, F is the fixed cost of entry, andrepresents unob-
served profits. Listed below are the variables we use to proxy for each
of the components of the profit function.
P: Payment
The regressor of interest is the CMS per-enrollee, per-month payment
specific to the county We enter the CMS payment directly and interact
it with an indicator for the BBA regime (1998-2001), which allows the
effect of the CMS payment to vary before and after the BBA of 1997
took effect. These payment variables include bonuses, paid only in
2000 and 2001, which are equal to 5 percent of the per-enrollee payment
for the first year, and 3 percent of the per-enrollee payment for the sec-
ond year, that an HMO operates in a previously unserved county.2°CMS Payments 11
Table 1.2
Percentage of counties with at least one active Medicare managed care HMO, by qumtile
of Medicare beneficiaries in 1990a
aData: CMS market penetration files, 1993-2001, and Area Resource File.
Although in practice the per-capita payments of CMS to HMOs are
adjusted to take into account the demographic and (more recently) risk
factors associated with the enrollee, we do not make these adjustments.
Thus, the payment used in our empirical work represents the payment
for the average enrollee.21
Summary statistics of the CMS per-enrollee monthly payments are
listed in table 1.3 in nominal dollars. Table 1.3 indicates that the aver-
age CMS county monthly payment per enrollee rose each year from
1993 to 2001. The variance in the county payments rose until 1997,
when the BBA was passed in part to reduce disparities in payments
across counties. Since 1997, the variance in payments across counties
has fallen each year. CMS payments to HMOs are constant during a
calendar year; the exception to this rule is 2001, when payments were
raised effective March 2001 by the Medicare, Medicaid, and State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) Benefits Improvement
and Protection Act of 2000. We use the March payment rate for 2001
because the dependent variable in 2001 is also created using March
data.
Year
Quintile of Medicare beneficiaries in 1990
1 2 3 4 5
1993 4.7 2.4 3.9 7.5 23.5
1994 5.4 3.6 6.0 10.7 30.6
1995 7.6 4.9 9.8 15.3 44.6
1996 9.8 7.2 13.0 22.4 57.2
1997 9.9 9.3 17.1 27.8 63.7
1998 10.9 10.4 18.9 31.4 65.8
1999 7.6 12.8 20.3 33.3 66.4
2000 6.5 12.4 17.1 31.1 63.4
2001 4.2 9.4 13.8 22.6 57.2
Number of counties 615 615 615 615 614
Minimum number of Medicare
beneficiaries in quintile 14 1,482 2,783 4,714 9,718
Maximum number of Medicare
beneficiaries in quintile 1,479 2,781 4,708 9,680 877,58112 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
Table 1.3
Summaiy statistics of monthly per-enrollee CMS payments, by yeara
Standard
Year Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
aFies are in nominal dollars. The BIPA of 2000 raised payments to HMOs effective
March 2001. Payments do not include bonuses for operating in previously unserved
counties during 2000 and 2001.
Source: HCFA Medicare managed care historical payment ifies, 1993-2001.
AVC: Average Variable Costs
We do not observe the average variable costs of HMOs; we estimate
these costs in the following way. We assume that average variable costs
in county c in year t, denoted AVCCt, have the following structure:




where A,1991 is the average Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) reim-
bursement per enrollee in county c in 1991. This amount is multiplied
by the percentage change in Part A costs since 1991, as measured by the
CMS Hospital Input Price Index, which is represented in the equation
above by PA,t?- Likewise, B,1991 is the average Medicare Part B (Supple-
mentary Medical Insurance) reimbursement per enrollee in county c in
1991. This amount is multiplied by the percentage change in Part B
costs since 1991, as measured by the CMS Medicare Economic Index,
which is represented in the equation above by P5,1.23 The change in costs
observed over time is due to prices, not necessarily utilization. Also
note that the Hospital Input Price Index and the Medicare Economic In-
dex are nationwide indices, and therefore all of the difference across
counties in costs is due to the baseline difference in costs in 1991. In the
1993 301.86 55.46 168.15 598.65
1994 314.72 58.29 171.07 653.44
1995 332.43 62.99 177.32 678.90
1996 372.13 70.58 207.31 881.35
1997 394.78 76.69 220.92 767.35
1998 417.09 62.99 367.00 782.70
1999 427.33 62.69 379.84 798.35
2000 449.78 56.85 401.52 809.28
2001 Jan.-Feb.) 460.39 56.66 414.88 825.46
2001 (Mar-Dec.) 498.82 41.70 475.00 833.55CMS Payments 13
regression model, Part A and Part B costs will be entered separately.
HMOs may be better able to control one type of costs than the other,
and therefore costs in the two areas may have different effects on the
likelihood that HMOs will participate.
In the average variable costs equation listed above, X is a vector of
county characteristics that may affect costs, specifically, the number of
general practitioners in 1990, the number of registered nurses in 1990,
the number of hospitals in 1993, and median rent in 1990.24 We also in-
clude as regressors population density and the percentage of the popu-
lation that is urban because geographically dispersed populations may
be more costly to serve. Finally, year-specific costs are captured by I, an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation is for year t.
S: Size of the Market
Although the sample is limited to relatively populous counties, even
within that group, HMOs may prefer to enter more populous counties.
We control for the size of the county market using the number of
Medicare beneficiaries in the county in 1990.25 We also include the per-
centage change in this number from 1980 to 1990 to account for the fact
that HMOs may prefer to enter growing markets.
F: Fixed Costs of Entry
We control for two factors that Brown and Gold (1999) suggest affect
the fixed costs of entry into the Medicare managed care market. The
first is whether the HMO already operates in the commercial market in
the county This may affect the fixed costs of entering Medicare man-
aged care for two reasons: (1) the HMO would have already sunk the
costs of establishing a network of health care providers in the county
(that is, there may be economies of scope to participating in multiple
managed care markets in the same county), (2) CMS limits participa-
tion in the Medicare managed care market to HMOs participating in
the county's commercial market. HMOs that historically participated
in the commercial market of the county may face lower barriers to en-
tering the Medicare managed care market.
We do not simply control for the number of HMOs participating in
the county's commercial managed care market. Because an HMO could
enter a county's commercial market for the purpose of subsequently
entering its Medicare managed care market, current participation in
the commercial market may be endogenous. Instead, we control for the14 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
number of HMOs in the county in 1980, before the TEFRA of 1982 cre-
ated the modern Medicare managed care market.26 We also control for
the likelihood of HMOs participating in the county commercial market
using the percentage of the workforce in manufacturing or white-collar
jobs in 1990. The presence of these types of workers proxies for the
presence of employers likely to demand commercial managed care for
its employees.
The second factor that affects the fixed cost of entering a county
Medicare managed care market is whether an HMO participates in
nearby counties. It may be cheaper for an HMO to enter a county adja-
cent to its current service area because the HMO may already be famil-
iar with local providers and have acquired information about the local
market. To proxy for the likelthood of participating in adjacent coun-
ties, we control for the total number of Medicare beneficiaries in 1990 in
all adjacent counties and its percentage growth from 1980 to 1990.
d: Probability That Medicare Eligibles Will Enroll in Medicare Managed
Care
It has been found repeatedly that relatively healthy Medicare bene-
ficiaries are the most likely to enroll in managed care.27 To capture
cross-county differences in the proportion of healthy beneficiaries (and
therefore demand for Medicare managed care), we control for per cap-
ita income, the poverty rate among the county's elderly, the percentage
of adults with a high school diploma, and the percentage of adults with
a college degree.28 Each of these variables was measured in 1990.
Summary statistics for the sample used in this paper appear in ta-
ble 1.4.
We acknowledge that characteristics of the individual HMOs partici-
pating in the market may affect variable or fixed costs, or the triggers at
which the HMO will enter or exit. For example, certain model types
may be more efficient at providing care and the exit trigger may be
lower for nonprofit than for for-profit HMOs. We ignore the character-
istics of the individual participating HMOs for two reasons. First, these
characteristics are endogenous. An HMO may change its model type or
profit status to suit the characteristics of the markets in which it partici-
pates. Second, as mentioned earlier, HMO entry into Medicare man-
aged care is an example of a multiple-agent discrete-move game. It is
likely that multiple equilibria exist and that the number of firms partic-
ipating is determined, but the identity of the individual HMOs that







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































216 Cawley, Chernew, and MeLaughim
IV.Empirical Results
The results of the ordered probit regression of the number of HMOs
participating in Medicare managed care at the county level are pre-
sented in table 1.5. In all the results reported in this paper, standard er-
rors are cluster-corrected to account for the dependence in errors
within each county over time. The coefficients on CMS payment and
CMS payment interacted with the BBA regime are positive and statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level, which is consistent with our hy-
pothesis that, controffing for costs, a higher payment is associated with
the participation of more FIMOs.
As described in Section II, the coefficients presented in table 1.5 can
be used to calculate the CMS payments necessary to support a given
number of HMOs in the market. Each county has unique thresholds
needed to support given numbers of HMOs in this program. Rather
than report the thresholds associated with over 2,000 counties, table 1.6
lists the payment thresholds associated with counties at the 25th, 50th,
75th, and 100th percentiles for payment threshold.
Table 1.6 indicates that to support a single HMO in the median
county in the sample, it is necessary for CMS to pay $682.08 per aver-
age enrollee per month in the median county. To support a single HIvlO
in every county of the sample, CMS would have to pay $1,008.25 per
average enrollee per month in the maximum-payment county.
Table 1.6 also lists the CMS payment thresholds necessary to support
multiple HMOs in county Medicare managed care markets. CMS may
desire multiple HMOs in each market because the competition be-
tween the HMOs for market share leads to lower out-of-pocket costs
and additional benefits for enrollees. Table 1.6 suggests that, condi-
tional on two HMOs already participating, CMS must pay roughly
$115 more per enrollee per month to support each additional Medicare
HMO.
Although we report our estimated thresholds to the cent, we do not
claim absolute precision about the estimates. The exact threshold is de-
termined in part by assumptions, such as the functional form of regres-
sion. The standard errors, which appear in parentheses below the
thresholds in table 1.6, in some cases imply large confidence intervals.
Derivation of standard errors for the thresholds is difficult because the
thresholds are nonlinear functions of several random variables. Ac-
cordingly, we calculate bootstrap standard errors. Specifically, boot-
strap samples of size equal to the overall sample are formed byTable 1.5
Ordered probit regression of number of HMOs in county on county characteristics
aCoefficients on indicator variables for missing values are omitted.
bZ scores reflected cluster-corrections of standard errors by county.
Variable CoefficientaZ Scoreb
Payment
CMS payment .0034 4.04
CMS payment * indicator for 1998-2001 .0016 4.61









Variables affecting average variable costs
Average Medicare Part A costs -.00002 -0.88
Average Medicare Part B costs .0002 1.41
Number of general practitioners .0030 3.09
Number of registered nurses -.0002 -2.87
Number of hospitals .0067 0.65
Median rent .0034 6.66
Population density -.00002 -1.85
Percentage of population in urban areas .0013 0.84
Measures of the size of the market
Number of Medicare beneficiaries .000007 2.36
Percentage of growth in Medicare beneficiaries .3024 2.07
Variables affecting fixed costs of entry
Number of HMOs in county in 1980 -.0202 -0.18
Percentage of workforce in manufacturing -.0042 -1.12
Percentage of workforce who are white collar .0276 3.12
Number of Medicare beneficiaries in all adjacent counties .000003 7.35
Percentage growth in Medicare beneficiaries in all
adjacent counties .4744 2.24
Variables affecting the probability of enrollment
Per capita income -.00002 -1.90
Poverty rate among elderly -1.1877 -1.55
Percentage of adults with high school diploma .0223 3.36
Percentage of adults with college degree -.0400 -4.18
Number of observations 16,596
Log likelihood -12,618.918 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
Table 1.6
Estimated monthly payments necessary to support given numbers of HMOs in Medicare
managed care per county in the year 2001'
aCalated using coefficients reported in table 1.5.
bSample consists of counties with Medicare population in top three quintiles. Bootstrap
standard errors appear in parentheses. Payments calculated using ordered probit
coefficients.
randomly selecting, with replacement from the overall sample, all ob-
servations of a particular county The standard errors are calculated
from the variance observed in the thresholds calculated using the boot-
strapped samples. We follow the recommendation of Efron and
Tibshirani (1993) and conduct 200 replications to estimate standard
errors.
Table 1.7 compares the mean characteristics of two groups of coun-
ties: those in which CMS payments in the year 2001 were more than the
estimated payment necessary for one HMO to participate in the county
and those in which CMS payments were less than that threshold. The
table also lists the difference in means and the t statistic associated with
the test of the hypothesis that the means are equal across the two
groups of counties.
In the year 2001,381 counties in the sample were assigned CMS pay-
ments that exceeded the estimated payment necessary to support one
HMO, while 1,463 counties were assigned payments less than the sin-
gle-HMO threshold. Table 1.7 indicates that counties assigned pay-
ments greater than the estimated single-HMO threshold have both
higher CMS payments and higher Part A and B Medicare costs than the
Desired number of
HMOs I county
Monthly CMS payment necessary ($)
25th percentile Median 75th percentile Maximum
1 568.75 682.08 764.21 1,008.25
(19.23) (55.70) (85.61) (147.02)
2 710.18 823.51 905.64 1,149.68
(59.26) (99.33) (129.38) (189.77)
3 832.03 945.36 1,027.49 1,271.53
(96.42) (136.95) (167.03) (226.79)
4 947.45 1,060.78 1,142.90 1,386.95
(132.63) (173.36) (203.46) (262.99)
5 1,053.46 1,166.79 1,248.91 1,492.96
(162.61) (203.38) (233.48) (292.95)
6 or more 1,163.66 1,277.00 1,359.12 1,603.17


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































320 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
counties assigned payments less than the threshold. In addition, the
counties with above-threshold payments have many more hospitals
and general practitioners and, in general, have better educated and
wealthier populations. Each of these differences is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent significance level. Perhaps the most dramatic
difference is in the size of the Medicare population: counties assigned
payments greater than the estimated single-HMO threshold have on
average a Medicare beneficiary population of almost 51,900, whereas
counties assigned payments less than that threshold have on average
a Medicare bene- ficiary population of only about 8,000.
If a below-threshold current payment can be interpreted as an un-
derestimate by CMS of costs in that county, then our results suggest
that CMS tends to underestimate the costs of FIMO participation in
sparsely populated counties. Several studies noted that, under the
TEFRA payment scheme that was used prior to 1998, rural counties
were particularly unlikely to be served by HMOs.29 Passage of the
BBA was intended to eliminate such disparities by raising payments
more quickly in low-payment than in high-payment counties. We find
that even three years after the BBA took effect, counties with CMS
payment insufficient to support 1-IMO participation tend to be far less
populous than counties that receive what we estimate to be sufficient
payment. This pattern is found in a sample that includes only those
counties with a Medicare population large enough to be considered
viable for HMO activity in this program.
V.Conclusion
At the end of 1998, 1999, and 2000, HMO exits from Medicare man-
aged care markets resulted in the involuntary disenroilment of hun-
dreds of thousands of elderly and disabled Americans from a
program that was intended to generate additional benefits for
beneficiaries and savings for Medicare. This paper estimates the CMS
payments necessary to support the participation in Medicare man-
aged care of a given number of HMOs per county market. Ordered
probit estimates suggest that, to support one Medicare HMO in half of
U.S. counties in our sample in 2001, CMS would have to pay $682.08
per average enrollee per month in the marginal county. To support
one Medicare HMO in every county in the sample in the year 2001,
CMS would need to pay $1,008.25 per enrollee per month in the maxi-CMS Payments 21
mum-payment county. In the year 2001, actual CMS payments range
from $475.00 to $833.55.
Competition among Medicare HMOs generates additional services
at lower cost for enrollees. If CMS desires multiple HMOs to partici-
pate in county markets, our estimates suggest that even greater pay-
ments are required. If two HMOs are already participating, roughly an
extra $115 per enrollee per month is necessary to support each addi-
tional Medicare HMO.
We find that 79.3 percent of all counties in our sample received less
than the estimated amount necessary to support an HMO in this mar-
ket. Compared to counties that received more than the estimated
threshold for HMO participation, the counties receiving an insufficient
payment are on average more rural and are less populated with citi-
zens who are wealthy and educated. The relative disadvantage of rural
and unpopulated counties persists three years after the BBA 1997,
which was designed to eliminate such disparities, took effect. This pat-
tern is found in a sample that includes only those counties with a
Medicare population large enough to be considered viable for HMO
activity in this program.
Notes
We thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions: Scott Adams,
David Colby, Julie Cullen, Rachel Dunifon, Alan Garber, Hanns Kuttner, David Meltzer,
Katie Merrell, and participants at the NBER Frontiers in Health Policy Research Confer-
ence held June 7, 2001, in Bethesda, Maryland. We thank Phil DeCicca for his expert re-
search assistance. Please email comments to jhc38@cornell.edu.
In 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration was renamed the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. For the sake of consistency, the agency is referred to
throughout this paper as CMS.
HMOs competing for market share in the Medicare managed care market tend to
lower their premia or offer additional benefits to enrollees; see Physician Payment Re-
view Commission (1996) and General Accounting Office Report 97-133 (1997c).
Medicare beneficiaries may enroll only in those 1-livIOs with a risk contract from CMS
to serve the beneficiary's county of residence. Medicare beneficiaries suffering from
end-stage renal disease are not eligible for Medicare managed care.
CMS Medicare Managed Care Contract Reports are the source of the data shown in
figures 1.1 and 1.2. The data for each year are from the December report, except the data
for 2001, which are from the January report.
Health Care Financing Administration Medicare Managed Care January Contract Re-
port (2001).22 Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin
Laschober et al. (1999).
Health Care Financing Administration (2000b).
Studies of data prior to 1990 find that the health care costs of Medicare managed care
enrollees were 20-42 percent lower than fee-for-service beneficiaries with the same de-
mographic characteristics. Studies of post-1990 data find that the health care costs of
Medicare managed care enrollees were 12-37 percent lower than comparable fee-for-ser-
vice Medicare beneficiaries; see the review in General Accounting Office Report 97-16
(199Th). This has held true even after passage of the BBA. It is estimated that in 1998
1-IMOs were paid on average $1,000 more per enrollee than CMS would have paid had
the enrollees remained in fee-for-service Medicare; see General Accounting Office Report
00-161 (2000). This favorable selection occurred even though HMOs are prohibited by
law from selecting enrollees on the basis of health status.
Some provisions of the BBA were amended by the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of
1999 and the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act
of 2000.
In addition, the BBA requires CMS to adjust payments by the health status of plan
enrollees. The risk adjustment will be phased in; payments in 2001 are 10 percent risk ad-
justed and 90 percent adjusted only for demographic factors. The full amount of the pay-
ment will be risk-adjusted by 2004.
The bonus is paid to the first HlvIO to enter a previously unserved county; if several
HMOs enter on the same date, they each receive the bonus.
These papers did not study the market for Medicare managed care. Bresnahan and
Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991b) studied markets for retail and professional service industries;
Dranove, Shanley, and Simon (1992) studied hospitals; and Brasure, Stearns, Norton, and
Ricketts (1999) studied physicians. Using a different methodology Kronick, Goodman,
Wennberg, and Wagner (1993) estimated the metropolitan area population necessary to
support three HMOs in the commercial managed care market.
Cameron and Trivedi (1998), p. 86.
If the dependent variable in an ordered probit regression has M categories, the cut-
offs represent fitted values above which the model predicts that the dependent variable
willequalmform=1,...,M.
The Area Resource File (ARF) is a compilation of data from various sources. Unless
otherwise noted, the original source of data taken from the ARF is the 1990 Census of
Population and Housing.
See, for example, Marshall (1920), Book V, Chapter 1.
The enrollment data used to determine HMO participation is that for December for
1993-1997 and 2000, October for 1998-1999, and March in 2001. December reports are not
used for 1998 and 1999 because the figures listed in those December reports are actually
from the following January.
A plan is a uniform set of benefits and premiums. Each HMO may offer multiple
plans. In our data, we find only thirty-seven counties in which a single HMO offers two
plans.
We top-code the dependent variable because it can be difficult to estimate an ordered
probit for values of the dependent variable that appear rarely in the data.CMS Payments 23
We determine whether each county is eligible for a bonus by checking the Medicare
Managed Care geographic service area reports to see whether any HTvIO had a risk con-
tract with CMS to serve the county the previous calendar year.
Demographic and risk adjustments are uniform across counties.
The Hospital Input Price Index tracks changes in the prices of hospital inputs such as
wages, salaries, benefits, professional fees, utilities, liability insurance, pharmaceuticals,
food, chemicals, medical instruments, photographic supplies, rubber and plastics, paper
products, apparel, machinery and equipment, and other inputs.
The Medicare Economic Index tracks changes in the prices of inputs to physi-
cian-provided care such as physician compensation, nonphysician compensation, office
expenses, medical materials and supplies, liability insurance, medical equipment, and
other expenses.
The source of the data on the number of doctors is the American Medical Association
Physician Masterfile, and that for the number of hospitals is the American Hospital Asso-
ciation Survey of Hospitals.
The number of Medicare beneficiaries includes both elderly and disabled
beneficiaries (both are eligible for managed care). In 1998, the elderly represented 87.06
percent of all Medicare beneficiaries.
The source of the data on commercial LIMO historic participation is the National
HMO Census of Prepaid Plans.
Chapter 15 of Physician Payment Review Conunission (1996) summarizes the litera-
ture that finds Medicare beneficiaries who enroll in managed care, compared to those
who remain in fee-for-service Medicare, tend to have had lower utilization and Medicare
costs in the preceding few years. See also General Accounting Office Report 97-160
(1997a). A similar difference in prior utilization characterizes those who enroll in com-
mercial managed care plans; see the summary in Glied (2000). Possible reasons that the
relatively healthy are more likely to enroll in managed care are that they are less likely to
have an established health care provider and that they may be less averse to the risk that
LIMOs may deny them certain treatments.
We assume that the per-capita income and education of Medicare beneficiaries track
those of the entire adult population in the county. The source of data on the poverty rate
among the elderly is the Small Area Income Poverty estimates from the Bureau of the
Census and that for per-capita income is the U.S. Department of Commerce.
See, for example, Serrato, Brown, and Bergeron (1995).
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